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ABSTRACT
Recent research has questioned whether explicit thinking is necessary or even useful for
complex decision making (Gladwell, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Newell, Wong,
Cheung, & Rakow, in press). The present research approaches this issue by examining how
different types of decision support facilitate/hinder performance in a diagnostic medical task.
The results from 3 experiments indicate that providing an external memory aid improves
performance in complex tasks. Additional support in the form of a coding procedure improved
awareness of the magnitude of drug effects, but did not improve detection of negative side
effects. The results suggest that while performance is improved, participants prescribed the
correct treatments for the wrong reasons. Important differences in task representation (and
resulting knowledge) due to the different forms of decision support are also discussed.

vi

INTRODUCTION
Recent research has questioned whether explicit thinking is necessary or even useful for
complex decision making (Gladwell, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Newell, Wong,
Cheung, & Rakow, in press). It has been argued that better decisions can be made if one is given
time to consolidate information implicitly, either by preoccupying oneself with another task or
by sleeping, or by making an immediate judgment without reflection (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006; Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, in press). This is contrary to the common sense notion
that explicit, well-thought decisions are superior to ‘snap’ judgments. To help illustrate, explicit
processing is typically characterized as conscious, controlled, and deliberate processing. Implicit
processing, in contrast, is said to be intuitive, automatic, and involve experiential processing.
Thus, the contention revolves around whether or not one should ‘think’ about things before
making a decision.
Curiously, this debate appears focused on an either/or perspective. That is, one should
focus predominantly on one mode or the other. Consequently, by focusing on the ‘wrong’ mode,
we are likely to arrive at a poor decision. However, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
which we use only one mode of processing. If we engage both modes when experiencing and
evaluating the world, then it may be more productive to consider how the interaction of the two
systems affects learning. As such, it is not that we engage in one mode or the other, so much as
the degree to which we engage in each (Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, &
Druhan, 1989; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989). Thus, any failures are not due to
one mode of processing alone, but rather are failures of the two modes to work together
effectively (Sallas, Mathews, Lane, & Sun, 2007; Sun, Zhang, Slusarz, & Mathews, 2007). Such
failures would be examples of negative interactions, while examples of the systems productively
benefiting from each other would be positive interactions.
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One way in which one might alter these interactions is by supplementing the underlying
processes with cognitive aids. Cognitive aids are external tools (e.g., calculators or check lists)
that can be used to perform a task. They generally move the thinker toward relying more on the
explicit mode because they stimulate explicit reflection. However since both modes depend on
the experience of training, it is possible for cognitive aids to either facilitate or impair both types
of learning. For example, cognitive aids which alter ones’ representation of events could either
impair or facilitate both modes of learning. If performance depends on effectively using both
modes of thinking, then it should be possible to supplement processing with appropriate
cognitive aids to create positive interactions (Mathews et al., 1989; Stanley et al., 1989; Sallas et
al., 2007; Sun et al., 2007).
In order to make valid generalizations, it is important that any task used simulates some
of the richness of complexity found in the world. In the real-world, the decisions that we make
are often based on multiple factors. Proper management of resources is a good example. We can
think of this not only in terms of a corporation with employees, product deadlines, etc., but also
in more personal terms, like our own finances with bills, grocery expenses, travel expenses,
whether income is bi-weekly or monthly, etc. These decisions are made complex not only by the
number of features one must evaluate, but also through the influence of time on the decision
sequence. For example, the amount owed on next month’s bill is due in part to whether or not the
bill was paid this month. There are also ‘side effects’ to each decision, such as the loss of power,
because of a delinquent bill.
One way to capture these rich complexities in the laboratory is through the use of
dynamic decision making (DDM) experiments. DDM experiments involve a series of
interdependent decisions that are made in an environment that changes as a function of the
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decision sequence, independent of the decision sequence, or in both ways (Edwards, 1962).
DDM is commonly studied through the use of ‘microworlds.’ Microworlds (Turkle, 1984) are
simulations that share many of the features that are believed to be present in real-world
scenarios. Thus, they allow us to study decision making in a variety of complex scenarios.
Features of DDM
To better understand how they can aid in the study of decision making in a complex
world, it is important to highlight the major features of DDM experiments. These features are
dynamics, complexity, opaqueness, and dynamic complexity (Brehmer, 1992; Diehl & Sterman,
1995; Gonzalez et al., 2005). Dynamics refers to the time element of the system. That is, the state
of the system at time t is dependent upon the state at time t – 1 (Rouse, 1981). One example of an
area of interest with respect to the dynamics of a system is the amount and quality of feedback
over time (feedback loops). Complexity can be defined by multiple features. The number of
variables, the number of variable interactions, and the types of variable interactions all contribute
to system complexity (Gonzales et al., 2005). Opaqueness refers to the ‘invisibility’ of one or
more aspects of the system (Brehmer, 1992). Sterman (1989) defines the dynamic complexity as
combining aspects of dynamics and complexity in order to highlight their effects on information
available from the feedback loop.
One example of a DDM task is the process control task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984;
Stanley et al., 1989; Lane, Mathews, Sallas, Prattini, & Sun, 2008). The process control task has
had many cover stories, such as controlling: a sugar factory, a nuclear reactor, or a computer
personality named ‘Clegg’. During the task, participants are asked to maintain a particular level
of output (i.e. sugar pellets) by manipulating a single input (i.e. number of workers). The
program operates according to a simple formula: output = |2*(workers) – (previous output) +
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(noise)|. Noise in the task, when included, was either +1000, -1000, or 0 with equal probability.
Participants were given immediate feedback on each trial.
Previous Research
Previous research using the process control task has yielded evidence for positive
facilitation through cognitive aids. Roussel (1999) used the sugar factory version of the process
control task. He attempted to aid learning in the task by providing cognitive support. One of his
support groups was given a hint (a list of 3 valid solutions to particular states). It was assumed
that this small set of answers would assist participants in learning how to control the reactor.
Indeed, this is what Roussel (1999) found. The hint group outperformed an experiential control
group that received no support at all. This data suggests that cognitive support can lead to
increased performance in DDM.
Lane et al. (2008) used the nuclear reactor version of the process control task to perform
a follow-up study to Roussel (1999). Though Roussel (1999) had demonstrated that the hint
could lead to better performance, he did not demonstrate whether the improved performance was
the result of having 3 correct answers (and thus getting 25% of the states correct all of the time),
or the result of improved learning from the decision support. Lane et al.’s (2008) design included
3 separate groups: an experiential group (which just performed the task without aid), a quiz-only
group, and a quiz + hint group. The latter two groups were periodically interrupted and asked a
series of questions about how to solve the task. The results from the experiment showed that
while the quiz caused the latter two groups to reflect on the task (and hence perform better than
the experiential group), the hint + quiz group performed the best overall. Moreover, analysis of
the data showed that this improvement occurred in the non-hint states as well. That is,
improvement was not restricted to the small subset of correct answers provided by the hint, but
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rather the hint was used as a guide to aid participants in learning to control the reactor. This data
further supports the hypothesis that cognitive support can lead to increased performance in
DDM.
Mathews (unpublished) took a slightly different approach. This study used the cover
story of controlling the computer personality ‘Clegg.’ The key manipulation involved the degree
of support that the participant received. Participants received either: no support, reflection,
reflection + hint, or a partial formula. In the two reflection groups, participants were asked to
write a set of instructions for someone else describing how to control Clegg. The reflection +
hint group received the same type of hint as the Roussel (1999) and Lane et al. (2008). Finally,
the partial formula group was given the formula: (N) * (input) [+, -, x, or /] (previous state) =
(new state). They were told that ‘N’ stood for some number. Thus, they only needed to figure out
‘N’ and one operator. The results showed that when there was no noise in the system, each group
performed similarly. However, when noise was used in the program, some types of support
hindered performance. The reflection group and partial formula group both performed worse
than the experiential group. The reflection + hint group however still outperformed all of the
other groups.
The differences in performance in the Mathews (unpublished) study highlight an
intriguing interaction between decision support and task complexity. As complexity changed in
the task (qua change in variability due to noise), the quality of the benefit each support provided
changed. One possible explanation deals with task representation. The representation that one
has affects the salience (or obscurity) of particular features within the task. These changes can
also facilitate a change in the strategy employed as what becomes deemed as the ‘relevant’
features change.
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To relate back to the DDM structure, these are changes along the opaqueness and
dynamic complexity dimensions. For example, the partial formula group clearly sees the
relationship between the variables. That is, there is a single underlying formula that ties each of
the input and output states. This removes some of the opaqueness. However, the increased
salience of the relationship blinds the participant to influence of noise (since noise is not listed as
a feature of the formula given to them). This blindness can be attributed to a change in dynamic
complexity. That is, participants are likely to interpret feedback differently. Rather than seeing
that their hypothesis is getting them ‘roughly there’, the increased salience of the formula might
incline them to reject anything that does not produce a clear 1-to-1 mapping.
Based on this interpretation, what is guiding the effectiveness of the decision support is
not merely the providing of aid, but rather how that aid supports the relevant underlying
processing. Since the type of aid can influence the type of processing used, it is important to
understand the processing requirements of the task. In other words, by understanding the
requisite requirements, one can better tailor support for that task and improve the quality of
decisions made within it. Similarly, one can come to understand the task requirements by the aid
that benefits performance in it. Before the issues are addressed further, it is important to first
examine how complexity and processing interact more broadly.
Increasing Complexity
Each of the previous studies have demonstrated that some form of decision support can
aid in improving performance in complex tasks like DDM. However, there remains a question of
whether or not decision support will continue to improve performance as the task continues to
increase in complexity. Dienes and Berry (1997) and Reber (1989) argue that implicit learning is
more robust than explicit learning. This notion is amplified by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006)
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who propose that explicit processing is good for simple decisions, but complex decision making
is better left to implicit processes. They argue that as complexity increases in a system one
should shift to more implicit processing of information, and thus performance should not
improve with decision support that encourages explicit reflective thought.
One way to understand this argument is by thinking in terms of representation and
processing limitations. Explicit processing relies on limited resources. As task complexity
increases, there is much more information to monitor. By shifting one’s representation of the
system, you can limit the amount of information that you need to monitor. However, as discussed
previously, incomplete task representation can hinder performance. Implicit processing is robust
with respect to variability and is a much higher capacity system. If uninfluenced by explicit
processes, it should lead to more accurate decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).
There is, of course, evidence for the opposite. Raab (2003) conducted a study of implicit
and explicit learning in sports (handball, volleyball, and basketball). Participants watched the
sports played on video. They later were asked about the tactics employed by each team. The
results showed that implicit learning excelled during situations of low tactical complexity.
During highly complex situations, participants benefitted from additional instructions that helped
explicit learning by calling attention to key elements in the situation.
Mathews (unpublished), also, found decision support to be helpful in complex situations.
All of the groups in this study performed relatively equal when there was no noise in the system.
However, when noise was introduced, there was a sharp change. The experiential group
performed better than most of the other groups, but not better than the reflection + hint group.
Therefore, there at least seems to be some evidence to suggest that some forms of decision
support can still provide aid (positive facilitation) as complexity increases. More critically,
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improvement is restricted to forms of decision support that best augment the underlying
processing requirements of the task.
These processing requirements may not necessarily be implicit or explicit in the strict
sense. Instead, support can facilitate or hinder both types of processing based on the degree to
which in encourages reliance on one type over the other. For example, support that heavily
engages strategic processing encourages explicit processing. This could change the
representation of the task and call more attention to critical features within the task. The
increased attention to the relevant features could then allow quicker implicit pattern abstraction
from the feedback loop. Thus, a more explicit type of support could improve both systems and
increase overall performance through positive facilitation. The goal of the present research is
explore this relationship by examining the effects of cognitive support on learning in complex
tasks.
Diagnostic Medical Task
To help address the issue of decision support in complex tasks, we have designed a new
DDM task. The task was designed to resemble some of the features encountered in real medical
practice. A doctor typically meets with many patients, most of whom do not see the doctor on
regular intervals. Doctors usually have a fair (but limited) amount of drugs to select from when
trying to mitigate a health problem. One important feature in determining this choice is the effect
that the drug has on the patient’s other health measures. That is, one does not want to replace a
problem with a new one.
To capture these features, the diagnostic medical task (DMT) requires participants to
assume the role of doctor. In this role, the participants take on the responsibility of trying to
improve the health of their patients. More specifically, they are trying to reach a designated
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‘optimal’ level in one health measure (Blood sugar), while trying to maintain a ‘safe’ level in
each of the other health measure of the patient. This is accomplished through simulating
meetings with patients during which the participant is allowed to make prescriptions from a list
of 5 drugs (inputs). They are allowed to prescribe 1 or 2 of the drugs on each visit, and must
monitor the effect of the prescription on 5 health measures (outputs). Participants judge each
output level according to a list of zones on the bottom of the monitor. Each patient’s reaction to
prescribed medications is governed by a template that is unknown to the participant. Patients can
either share the same template, or have unique templates. Furthermore, the combinations of
medications do not always operate by summing the effects of the individual drugs. In some
cases, they may have effects that are completely unrelated. Finally, participants must meet with
all of the patients on a given round, before seeing the result of their prescriptions. Since the
patient order is randomized on each round, the feedback delay for a particular patient can be
between 1 and 28 trials.
Two types of tests were conducted to assess performance and learning in the task. A
prescription test was given to assess the participant’s ability to prescribe the correct medication
to the proper individual. This was followed by a second test, the mental model test. It determined
the participant’s explicit knowledge about the effects of each drug.
Current Study
The current study uses the increased complexity offered by the DMT to study decision
support. Participants were assigned to training groups that differed in the type of decision
support received during (and prior to) training. A no support group that received no support was
compared to the various support conditions in each experiment.
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In Experiment 1, two levels of decision support were provided. The first type of support,
called ‘list’, is primarily a memory aid. Participants were given a list of all the drug combinations
that they used to record their knowledge of drug effects during training. The second type of
support group (list + strategy) was given the same list as the previous group, but was also given
additional instructions on how to use the list effectively to keep track of their knowledge and
eliminate non-effective drug combinations over time. The participants were also taught a means
of coding the magnitude of the main effect of the drug in accordance with the five possible
output zones. The five zones were: Excellent (90-100), Good (70-89), Acceptable (50-69), Poor
(20-49), and Critical (0-19). This procedure should help participants develop a representation of
each treatment’s effect at the appropriate level of abstraction. Such a representation would
remove some of the opaqueness due to noise in the system. That is, patients receiving the same
treatment do not stay at the same level (number within the zone) as each other, nor do they stay
at the same level visit by visit. Participants using the above mentioned coding procedure should
be relatively resilient to these fluctuations due to the appropriate level of abstraction (the zones).
Additionally, they were given strategic information. That is, they were taught to narrow their
pool of drug choices by eliminating the drugs in a systematic fashion. On the first reflective
period, they would eliminate all drugs with ‘Critical’ effects. On the next reflective period, they
would eliminate any drugs with ‘Poor’ effects, and so on. This strategy should help them to
effectively reduce the pool of drugs that they are hypothesis testing during the practice phase.
To help frame the manipulation, one can conceive of the no support condition as relying
predominantly on implicit learning. Without support, the potentially long feedback delays make
keeping track of the visit by visit changes for each patient (in addition to updating one’s
knowledge about the 15 combinations) difficult for explicit processes. In addition to enhancing
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memory, each of the support conditions push participants further towards the explicit end of the
spectrum because they are encouraged to reflect about the drug effects. For example, the list
condition provides very general/abstract information (in terms of drug effects). It affords a slight
advantage explicitly over the no support group because one can record and reflect upon this
general knowledge. The list + strategy condition provides the most explicit support. The task is
structured around very specific information (i.e. the output zones). The strategy implementation
should promote a better representation of the task by limiting focus to the relevant output while
the range of input choices is effectively reduced. It was hypothesized that performance would
improve with each additional level of cognitive support. However, the results did not support this
hypothesis. Instead, the moderate level of support (list only) yielded superior performance in the
task as compared to the list + strategy.
Experiment 2 examines the effect of teaching a rich coding scheme without using the
elimination strategy that failed to enhance performance in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 replicated
the format of Experiment 1 with the exception of the list + strategy condition. Rather than
employing a strategy, a new condition (list + code) was used in which participants received the
same list as in Experiment 1, but were given additional instructions for a specific coding
procedure. Participants were taught to record information about the specific zone each drug
moved the patient into as well as information about whether or not there were any side effects of
the drug. This condition would provide more salient information about each drug’s effects, while
preserving the participant’s ability to employ their own ‘natural’ strategies. It was again
hypothesized that performance will improve with each additional level of support.
Experiment 3 attempted to extend the findings of the previous experiments to an even
more complex task that is more similar to real medical practice and shed more light on the
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relationship between type of task complexity and useful task support. Unlike Experiments 1 & 2,
Exp. 3 partitioned patients into two template groups (i.e., typical and atypical patients) that are
unknown to the participant. Therefore, participants will have to determine the proper prescription
on a patient by patient basis. This is more akin to the real-world where all patients do not always
respond in the same way to the same treatment. The new variable of patient type increases the
level of opaqueness in the task by adding variability to the effects of key drug combinations. It is
hypothesized that adding a form of decision support that helps make this variability more salient
will enhance performance. In addition to the no support and list conditions, we tested a different
form of support, designed to make these patient differences less opaque, a matrix. This new
matrix condition received a matrix of patients and drugs, while the matrix + code condition
received both the matrix and the same coding procedure as the list + code condition. The purpose
of these manipulations will be discussed in more detail in the introduction to Exp. 3.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants and Design. All 88 participants were undergraduates enrolled in psychology
courses at Louisiana State University. They participated in the experiment to partially meet
course requirements. There were three training conditions: No support (control), List, and List +
strategy. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. There were 29 in
the no support group, 30 in the list group, and 29 in the list + strategy group.
Task and Procedure. In this task, participants play the role of a doctor. Their goal is to
improve the health of their patients. This was accomplished by learning the effects of various
medications, and then prescribing the best medication for each person. The participants were not
told ahead of time about any of the drug effects. Their goal was to find the medication that
improved the main output (Blood Sugar) to ‘excellent’, while maintaining the other 4 health
measures at ‘acceptable’ or better. Separate instructions were given to each condition. The no
support condition received information about the task. The list condition received information
about the task and about the external aid (such as when they would be allowed to use and what
information that were allowed to record in it). The list + strategy condition received all of the
previous instructions, but were additionally given information on how best to code information
on their external aid, as well as a strategy to help eliminate non-working drug combinations.
After receiving task instructions and watching a brief tutorial, participants started the learning
phase. This phase was divided into rounds which involved “meeting” with each of the patients
(N = 15) under their care (See Figure 1). The order of patients as well as the starting values on
the 5 health measures (output variables) was randomized. Each round, the order of patients was
again randomized. On each trial, participants indicated the drug or pair of drugs to be used with
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the individual patient. For the first two rounds, all participants were required to “continue the
previous doctor’s prescriptions” which were provided in a list with the instructions. This was
done to ensure that each participant was exposed to the full effects of each drug combination. All
drug combinations took 2 rounds before reaching full potency. In the support conditions,
participants were interrupted every 3 rounds and given an opportunity to record information.
During this time, the simulation screen was obscured and they were allowed to make notes on
the list provided (in accordance with the instructions), and could review the information from
previous recordings. The list was then put away and training resumed. After completing the
learning phase (40 minutes), participants were given two tests. Additional instructions preceded
each test and appeared on-screen (See Appendix A). The first test determined their ability to
prescribe the correct medications for each patient (See Figure 2). Then on a second test, they
were evaluated on their knowledge of the impact of the drugs on all measures of behavior (See
Figure 3). For each measure, they indicated the magnitude and direction of a drug’s impact on a
5-point scale that ranged from highly negative to highly positive (-2 <-> +2).
Performance on the task was primarily assessed by the number of correct prescriptions
made on the prescription test. A second measure of participants’ knowledge was gained by
analyzing the accuracy of their specific knowledge of the drug effects on all of the output
variables using what we call the mental model test.
Results and Discussion
Analysis of the results is focused on the 3 drug combinations which brought ‘Blood
Sugar’ into the desired range. The 3 drug combinations of interest are: DE (this drug
combination was excellent for ‘Blood Sugar’ and also had an excellent side effect); AD (this
drug combination was excellent for ‘Blood Sugar’ and had no side effect); and BC (this drug
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combination acted as a lure. It was excellent for ‘Blood Sugar’ but had a very strong negative
side effect). DE (positive side effect) and AD (No side effect) were considered correct answers
on the prescription test (for a complete list of drug effects, see Table 1). The analysis is also
divided up by test.

Figure 1. Main game screen. Zones are added to picture, but were actually on the bottom of the
monitor.
Prescription Test. On the prescription test, we compared the percentage of time that each
group prescribed each of the drugs that had a strong positive effect on the main output variable
(see Table 2). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group on prescribing the
correct drugs, F(2, 87) = 5.78, p < .01. There were no significant differences found with respect
to the lure drug, F(2, 87) = 0.78 , p > .05. Post-hoc tests were conducted using Fisher’s LSD. The
post-hoc tests revealed the no support group prescribed one of the correct drugs significantly less
than the list group and the list + strategy group (p=.001 and p<.05, respectively). A separate one-
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way ANOVA was conducted on each of the correct drugs individually (see Table 3). There were
no significant differences found with respect to the DE (positive side effect) combination, F(2,
87) = 0.21, p > .8. The one-way ANOVA on the AD (No side effect) combination, however, was
significant, F(2, 87) = 3.53, p < .05. Post-hoc tests using Fisher’s LSD only showed a difference
between the no support and list conditions (p<.01). The list condition prescribed the AD (No side
effect) combination significantly more often than the no support condition did.

Figure 2. Prescription test
These results suggest that the cognitive support provided did increase performance in the
task. That is, participants in each of the support conditions prescribed a correct combination
more often than the no support condition. Individual analysis of the correct drug combinations
showed that while the list + strategy condition required both correct drug prescriptions to be
totaled in order to show a difference, the list condition was far superior to the no support group at
prescribing AD (No side effect) alone.
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Figure 3. Mental model test
Table 1. Main effect template for patients in Exp. 1 & 2. Side effect is listed in parentheses.
Scale is + 2 to – 2. +2 being a strong positive effect (excellent zone) and -2 being a strong
negative effect (critical zone).
Aprizine
Bideran
Cympril
Dimryl
Ezicon
Aprizine

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

+2 (0)

0 (-2)

Bideran

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

+2 (-2)

0 (0)

0 (0)

Cympril

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (+2)

0 (0)

0 (+2)

Dimryl

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

+2 (+2)

Ezicon

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (0)

Mental Model Test. Next, we turn to the mental model test (see Table 4). The mental
model test assessed participants’ perceived effect of the drugs. A one-way ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of group on perceived main effect the AD (No side effect) drug combination,
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F(2, 87) = 3.40, p < .05. However, there were again no significant differences found with respect
to the lure drug, F(2, 87) = 1.74, p > .15. Nor, were there any significant differences between the
groups with respect to the DE (positive side effect) combination, F(2, 87) = 0.09, p > .9. Post-hoc
tests using Fisher’s LSD on the AD (No side effect) combination again revealed only significant
differences between the list group and the no support group (p = .011). Separate analyses on the
perceived side effect of each drug combination did not reveal any significant differences.
Table 2. Exp. 1 prescription test results. This is a breakdown of the correct drugs column from
the previous figure. Number listed is the percentage of time the correct drugs or lure drugs were
prescribed. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
Correct Drugs

Lure Drug

No support

49.20 (7.17)

7.13 (2.33)

List

80.44 (5.19)

13.78 (4.79)

List + Strategy

69.66 (7.33)

8.74 (4.23)

Table 3. Exp. 1 prescription test results. Number listed is the percentage of time the correct
drugs were prescribed. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
DE (positive side effect)

AD (No side effect)

No support

18.62 (5.06)

30.57 (6.83)

List

22.22 (6.62)

58.22 (7.02)

List + Strategy

24.60 (7.55)

45.06 (8.22)

The results of the mental model test show that the advantage of the cognitive support
provided was primarily limited to the list condition. While this still supports the idea that
cognitive support can improve performance on complex tasks, it is unclear why performance was
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hindered so much in the list + strategy condition (as compared to the list alone). While the list +
strategy condition performed nearly as well as the list condition on the prescription test, the
perceived main effect of the AD (No side effect) combination was marginally closer to that
reported by the no support condition. This is even more troubling if you consider that the list +
strategy condition kept track of the exact zones the main effect was moved to by each drug. If
anything, this should have resulted in more precise knowledge about the AD (No side effect)
combination’s effect. It is also not clear why the perceived main effect of the DE (positive side
effect) combination was so low in each group. This drug combination had clearly superior
overall effects (once the side effect is considered), or at the very least, comparable effects to the
AD (No side effect) combination (in the sense that it achieved the same main effect without a
negative side effect). It is possible that the perceived effect is so low due to the fact that it was
prescribed such a small percentage of the time. But, as previously stated, it remains unclear why
this combination was prescribed so little. It is also interesting (although a bit disturbing in its
practical implications) that although the lure drug was not often prescribed, there was no
evidence that anyone was aware of the negative side effect on the mental model test. Thus while
decision support enhanced performance, it did not increase awareness of a negative side effect.
Regardless, the data provide evidence that even as we increase complexity (DMT versus
process control), decision support (providing a list) can still lead to improved performance. This
is contrary to arguments presented earlier by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006), and instead,
adds to the growing body of data showing improvement from decision support in DDM.
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Table 4. Exp. 1 mental model test results. Number listed is on a scale from -2 to +2. -2 being a
strong negative effect (critical zone) and +2 being a strong positive effect (excellent zone).
Standard error is in parentheses.
Mental model test
DE
(positive side effect)

AD
(No side)

Lure
(negative side)

0.48 (0.21)

0.90 (0.23)

0.03 (0.21)

List

0.40 (0.22)

1.60 (0.16)

0.10 (0.22)

List + Strategy

0.34 (0.26)

1.24 (0.18)

0.55 (0.21)

No support

0.03 (0.12)

0.03 (0.08)

-0.14 (0.13)

List

0.10 (0.11)

0.13 (0.08)

0.00 (0.10)

List + Strategy

-0.17 (0.09)

0.00 (0.05)

0.03 (0.10)

Main Effect No support

Side Effect
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EXPERIMENT 2
The previous experiment demonstrated that decision support can lead to improved
performance under increasingly complex conditions. It is not clear from the previous results why
the list + strategy group performed as they did. Perhaps the strategy interrupted the natural, more
implicit, processes normally used by our participants. Experiment 2 was designed to address this
issue. It replicates the procedure of Experiment 1 with one significant change. The list + strategy
condition was changed to a list + code condition. In this new condition, participants received the
same list as the list condition from Experiment 1. Additionally, they received instructions on how
to code the main effect of the drug by zone (as the list + strategy condition did in Experiment 1)
and they were given additional information on how to code side effects.
The goal of this manipulation is two-fold. First, the coding procedure succeeds in
changing the representation of the task in the desired manner. That is, it makes some of the
features of the task more salient than in the other conditions (e.g. Participants keep track of
specific knowledge about the main effect and also specifically track side effects). This should
alter their interpretation of feedback by calling their attention to the relevant details. If true, then
the hypothesis from Experiment 1 should hold: performance should increase with each level of
support. Second, the coding procedure leaves the task open to participants’ use of their own
‘native’ strategies. If the strategy issue from Experiment 1 was interfering with natural strategies,
this group will perform well on the task, because they could better remember specific side effects
on the mental model test.
Methods
Participants and Design. All 113 participants were undergraduates enrolled in psychology
courses at Louisiana State University. They participated in the experiment to partially meet
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course requirements. As with Experiment 1, there were three training conditions: No support
(control), List, and List + code. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions. There were 38 in the no support group, 37 in the list group, and 38 in the list + code
group. A discussion of the sample size change can be found in Appendix B.
Task and Procedure. The task was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception of the
new list + code condition. This condition was provided a list. On the list, they were instructed to
record the zone that the main effect reached as a consequence of each drug combination.
Additionally, they were told that if they believed the drug had a side effect, they should record
this as well. Side effects were indicated by a ‘+’ if the drug had a positive side effect, and a ‘-‘ if
the drug had a negative side effect. Finally, they were instructed that the side effect might not
match the drug’s main effect. In other words, a drug with a large negative main effect could have
a positive side effect or negative side effect, and likewise for the other 4 magnitude main effects
as well.
Results and Discussion
Prescription Test. Analyses were conducted in the same manner as Experiment 1. The
mean percentages for the prescription test are listed in Table 5. A one-way ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of group on prescribing the correct drugs, F(2, 112) = 6.34, p < .01. Although
the difference was in the expected direction, less prescribing of the lure drug in the list code
condition, the difference was not significant, F(2, 112) = 2.43 , p = .09. The post-hoc tests using
Fisher’s LSD revealed the no support group prescribed one of the correct drugs significantly less
than the list + code group only (p=.001). A separate one-way ANOVA was conducted on each of
the correct drugs individually (see Table 6). There were no significant differences found with
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respect to the DE (positive side effect) combination, F(2, 112) = 0.93, p > .35, or the AD (No
side effect) combination, F(2, 112) = 2.61, p = .08.
Since the coding procedure was only given to the list + code condition, it was predicted
that the coding condition would be more aware of the side effect than the other two conditions. A
planned contrast was conducted comparing the list + code condition to the other two conditions
and revealed the list + code condition to have prescribed the lure condition significantly less
t(110) = -2.15, p < .05.
Table 5. Exp. 2 prescription test results. Number listed is the percentage of time the correct
drugs or lure drugs were prescribed. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
Correct Drugs

Lure Drug

No support

60.00 (6.34)

11.23 (3.37)

List

70.63 (5.50)

9.19 (3.75)

List + Code

86.67 (3.96)

2.28 (1.49)

Table 6. Exp. 2 prescription test results. This is a breakdown of the correct drugs column from
the previous figure. Number listed is the percentage of time the correct drugs or lure drugs were
prescribed. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
DE (positive side effect)

AD (No side effect)

No support

21.75 (5.48)

38.25 (6.29)

List

17.84 (5.24)

52.79 (6.31)

List + Code

28.77 (6.41)

57.89 (6.40)

23

This pattern of results demonstrates superiority of the list + code over the no support
group in terms of correct prescriptions. Though not significant, the list + code condition did
outperform the list condition as well. This performance boost was primarily derived from both an
increase in the prescription rates of the superior DE (positive side effect) combination, and the
clear reduction in the amount of time they prescribed the lure.
Mental Model Test. The mental model test data are reported in Table 7. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group on perceived main effect the AD (No side effect)
drug combination, F(2, 112) = 4.59, p = .012. A one-way ANOVA on the DE (positive side
effect) combination was nearly significant between groups, F(2, 112) = 3.02, p = .053. However,
there were again no significant differences found with respect to the lure drug, F(2, 112) = 1.56,
p > .21. Post-hoc tests using Fisher’s LSD on the AD (No side effect) combination again
revealed the list + code group reported significantly higher main effects for the AD (No side
effect) combination than the no support group (p = .003). Separate analyses on the perceived side
effect of each drug combination did not reveal any significant differences for the AD (No side
effect) combination, F(2, 112) = 0.12, p > .88, or the lure combination, F(2, 112) = 0.65, p > .50.
There were however significant differences found between groups in the one-way ANOVA on
the DE (positive side effect) combination, F(2, 112) = 4.55, p =. 013. Additional post hoc tests
revealed the list + code group reported a higher magnitude side effect for the DE (positive side
effect) combination than the list group.
Again, since the coding procedure was only given to the list + code condition, another
planned contrast was conducted comparing the list + code condition to the other two conditions
and revealed the list + code condition to have reported a significantly higher main effect of the
DE (positive side effect) drug combination, t(110) = 2.46, p < .05.
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The results of the mental model test demonstrate a clear advantage of the list + code
condition over the no support condition in terms of awareness of the positive side effect of DE
(positive side effect), however teaching them to explicitly encode side effects did not improve
their performance in terms of noting negative side effects of the lure on the mental model test.
The noticing of this side effect probably led to the increased prescribing of the DE (positive side
effect) combination on the prescription test, as well as the higher main effect reported for the DE
(positive side effect) combination by the list + code condition over both the no support and list
conditions.
These trends in the results support the earlier prediction that performance would improve
with each additional level of support. The additional coding procedure aided in recognition of the
positive side effect, but curiously failed to improve detection of the negative side effect. These
results also support the hypothesis that the problems with the list + strategy condition in
Experiment 1 was likely due to the adoption of the recommended strategy which may have
interfered with natural implicit learning processes. Further research will be needed to clarify
why this interference occurred.
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Table 7. Exp. 2 mental model test results. Number listed is on a scale from -2 to +2. -2 being a
strong negative effect (critical zone) and +2 being a strong positive effect (excellent zone).
Standard error is in parentheses.
Mental model test
DE
(Positive side effect)

AD
(No side effect)

Lure
(Negative Side)

0.16 (0.21)

1.03 (0.19)

0.26 (0.21)

List

0.16 (0.20)

1.43 (0.16)

0.30 (0.19)

List + Code

0.76 (0.19)

1.68 (0.11)

-0.11 (0.12)

No support

0.08 (0.09)

0.08 (0.10)

-0.11 (0.07)

List

-0.14 (0.10)

0.08 (0.11)

0.00 (0.12)

List + Code

0.29 (0.11)

0.03 (0.03)

-0.16 (0.10)

Main Effect No support

Side Effect
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EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was meant to contribute more towards an understanding of the relationship
between support and processing in complex tasks. It also extends the findings of the previous
experiments by adding an element of real-world complexity, individual differences. In the
previous experiments, all patients responded to the prescribed medications in the same way.
Thus, participants could test many hypotheses at the same time. Moreover, once they found a
combination that worked, that combination worked for all of their patients. By adding a second
template, the current experiment will allow for more variation in how the patients respond to the
prescribed medications. Participants will then have to explore their options on a patient by
patient basis. This more closely resembles how people respond to treatments in the real-world.
It should be noted that adding individual differences in the form of patient types to the
experiment introduces an additional level of variability into the system that is very opaque.
Recall that Mathews (unpublished) found that when noise was introduced into the system, some
types of decision support were disrupted. Although individual differences are not the same as the
random noise from that study, they do add an additional level of variability that may appear to
the participant, at first, like random noise. We hypothesize that decision support will work best
when it is designed to make opaque variables more salient.
We test this notion by introducing a new type of decision support designed to make
patient differences more salient. In addition to the two support conditions from Experiment 2,
two new support conditions (matrix and matrix + code) were added. Unlike the list conditions
which only have a list of the possible drug combinations, the table conditions are given a matrix
with a list of patients across one axis and the list of drug combinations across the other axis. The
goal of this manipulation is to determine whether having an external device is sufficient to
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improve performance, or if the quality of the external device is important. The new aids mirror
previous support in the type of information that can be recorded, but differ in the level of
specificity included (i.e. patient level knowledge). Importantly, the two new conditions still
preserve the participant’s ability to employ their own native strategies.
One way to frame this manipulation is to view it in terms of the DDM feature
opaqueness. By adding individual differences, a level of complexity is added that is opaque to
the user. For example, the no support, list, and list + code conditions have no clear way of
keeping track of patient differences. It is believed that without matrix support, participants will
‘average’ drug effects across patients and, thus, fail to learn about patient types. Motivation for
this hypothesis comes from previous research in which participants unintentionally integrated
knowledge of effects across different output variables (Tall, Mathews, Lane, & Sallas, 2007).
Similarly, it is posited that participants might average drug effects across patients without
recognizing patient types. In contrast, the matrix conditions will make individual differences
more visible (less opaque).
To clarify our hypotheses, it is predicted that: 1) the matrix conditions should exhibit
more accurate performance on the prescription test than the other conditions. That is, these two
conditions should have better patient level knowledge. 2) The code conditions should
demonstrate clearer knowledge of side effects on the mental model test. 3) The matrix + code
condition should have the best overall performance on the task. 4) The no support condition
should be good at estimating average effects of drugs, but be the worst at detecting and correctly
prescribing for patient types.
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Methods
Participants and Design. All 328 participants were undergraduates enrolled in psychology
courses at Louisiana State University. They participated in the experiment to partially meet
course requirements. There were 6 training conditions: No support (control), List, List + code,
Matrix, and Matrix + Code. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions.
There were 56 in the no support condition, 57 in the list condition, 55 in the list + code
condition, 55 in the matrix condition, and 50 in the matrix + code condition
Task and Procedure. The task and procedure are identical to those from Experiment 2
with three exceptions. First, as mentioned before, there are now two different patient templates.
10 out of 15 patients will operate according to one template, while the remaining 5 patients
operate in accordance with the second template. The two patient templates differ on 2 critical
drug combinations, AD (Majority drug) and CE (Minority drug) (See Tables 8 & 9). Also, it
should be noted that each template has only one correct prescription. This was meant to alleviate
some of the potential confusions from the previous two experiments in which there were
technically two correct answers. Second, two additional explicit support conditions were added.
These two conditions mirror the list and list + code conditions in terms of instructions, but differ
in the type of aid provided to them. Performance in this experiment will primarily come from
analysis of the prescription test. Participants will be scored on the correct ratio of prescriptions
(10 and 5). Participants will also receive a second score that determines how many prescriptions
were made to the right people. These scores will be used to separate their knowledge of the
patient types (ratio) from their knowledge about the individual patients (total correct). An
additional measure of performance will gained from the knowledge of overall drug effects and
side effects on the mental model test.
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Table 8. Main effect template for 10 out of 15 patients in Exp. 3. Side effect is listed in
parentheses. Scale is + 2 to – 2. +2 again being a strong positive effect (excellent zone) and -2
being a strong negative effect (critical zone).
Aprizine
Bideran
Cympril
Dimryl
Ezicon
Aprizine

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

+2 (0)

0 (-2)

Bideran

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

+2 (-2)

0 (0)

0 (0)

Cympril

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (+2)

0 (0)

0 (+2)

Dimryl

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

0 (0)

Ezicon

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (0)

Table 9. Main effect template for last 5 patients in Exp. 3. Side effect is listed in parentheses.
Scale is + 2 to – 2. +2 again being a strong positive effect (excellent zone) and -2 being a strong
negative effect (critical zone).
Aprizine
Bideran
Cympril
Dimryl
Ezicon
Aprizine

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (+2)

0 (-2)

Bideran

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

+2 (-2)

0 (0)

0 (0)

Cympril

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (+2)

0 (0)

+2 (0)

Dimryl

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

0 (0)

0 (0)

Ezicon

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxx

-2 (0)

Results and Discussion
The results focus on three drugs combinations. The first working combination (major)
succeeded in getting ‘Blood Sugar’ to the desired level for the majority template patients only.
The second working combination (minor) was similarly effective for only the minority template
patients. Finally, the lure combination from Experiments 1 & 2 was again analyzed, since it had

30

equal effect on both majority and minority template patients. The results will again be separated
by test.
Also, because the number of rounds completed during the 40 minute practice phase was
so dramatically different between groups in this experiment, ANCOVAs were used on all
analyses. Number of rounds was used as a covariate, and the adjusted means are displayed in
each of the figures. All post hoc analyses were conducted using Fisher’s LSD.
Prescription Test. The first analyses concerned the participants overall performance (see
Table 10). The ANCOVA revealed a significant effect of group. F(6, 328) = 3.25, p < .005. Post
hoc analyses showed the no support condition prescribed the correct drugs to the right people
significantly less often than the List condition (p < .01) and the Matrix + code condition (p <
.05).
Table 10. Exp. 3 prescription test results. Number listed is the percentage of time the correct
drug was prescribed to the correct person. Overall is across both templates, while major and
minor represent the breakdown of those individual templates. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
Correct (Overall)

Correct (Major)

Correct (Minor)

No support

35.3 (4.1)

42.0 (5.1)

21.8 (4.9)

List

50.7 (3.9)

56.5 (4.8)

39.1 (4.7)

List + Code

45.6 (4.0)

50.3 (4.9)

36.2 (4.8)

Matrix

45.8 (4.0)

51.2 (4.9)

35.1 (4.8)

Matrix + Code

47.5 (4.2)

53.5 (5.2)

35.6 (5.0)
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Separate ANCOVAs were conducted for each patient template. While the groups did not
significantly differ in the percentage of time they correctly prescribed the major drug to the
majority patients, F(6, 328) = 1.77, p > .10; they did differ significantly in the percentage of time
they were able to correctly match the minor drug to the minority patient, F(6, 328) = 3.44, p <
.005. Curiously, post hoc tests showed the no support condition to have prescribed the minor
drug correctly significantly less often than the list (p < .01) and the list + code (p < .05) only, but
was trending towards being significantly less often than matrix (p = .058) and matrix + code (p =
.056).
This pattern of results is quite complex. First, each of the support conditions prescribed
the minor drug correctly more often than the no support condition. This much was expected.
However, the list condition was the most accurate of the support conditions at prescribing the
minor drug correctly. This is contrary to what was expected, since the list condition does not
allow for any means of keeping track of individual patients. Second, the list condition was
slightly superior to the matrix + code condition in terms of the total number of correct
prescriptions. Again, this is unexpected because the most general form of support (list) is
performing comparably to the most specific (matrix + code).
Further analysis of the data was conducted on the sheer number of times particular
combinations were prescribed in general (see Table 11). There were no significant differences
found between the groups relative to the amount of time they prescribed either the major drug,
F(6, 328) = 1.53, p > .15, or the lure drug, F(6, 328) = 1.70, p > .10. However, significant
differences in prescription rates were observed between groups for the minor drug, F(6, 328) =
2.91, p < .01. Interestingly, post hoc tests revealed the list condition to prescribe the minor drug
more often than the no support (p = .02) and matrix + code conditions (p = .009). Though not
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significant, the pattern of results is trending in a similar fashion for the list + code condition. The
results suggest the list and the list + code conditions might be getting more minor prescriptions
to the minority patients due to their increased rate of prescribing the drug. Thus, the list
condition’s correct prescriptions might be a function of broadly prescribing the two working
drugs, while the matrix + code condition might be better at selectively identifying the proper
drug for the proper patient.
Table 11. Exp. 3 prescription test results. Number listed is the percentage of time the drug was
prescribed in general. Standard error is in parentheses.
Prescription test
Major

Minor

Lure

No support

34.6 (3.9)

14.2 (2.5)

12.2 (3.1)

List

45.1 (3.7)

22.0 (2.3)

10.0 (3.0)

List + Code

43.8 (3.8)

19.2 (2.4)

17.5 (3.0)

Matrix

38.6 (3.8)

15.7 (2.4)

14.6 (3.0)

Matrix + Code

43.5 (4.0)

12.9 (2.5)

12.8 (3.2)

A follow-up analysis was conducted to determine precision of prescriptions (see Table
12). Here, precision is defined as the amount of time you correctly prescribed a drug to the
proper patient type as a function of the number of times you prescribed a working drug. Note
how this is different from the early overall correct assessment which evaluated the amount of
time you prescribed a drug to the proper patient type as a function of the number of patients.
Thus, while the later measure was always out of 15 (the total number of patients), the former
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measure varied based upon how often you prescribed the drugs. For example, a participant could
have prescribed a working drug only 2 times, but prescribed them to the proper two patients.
This would result in 100% precision (2/2), but only 13% accuracy (2/15). Because the precision
measure focuses on the number of times prescribed, it becomes a more stringent measure of
patient level knowledge. The ANCOVA uncovered significant group differences in prescription
precision, F(6, 328) = 2.49, p < .02. Post hoc tests confirmed that the matrix + code condition
was more precise than the no support (p = .013) and list + code conditions (p = .046). Similarly,
the matrix condition was shown to be more precise than the no support (p = .014) and, nearly, the
list + code conditions (p = .051). Though the matrix + code and matrix condition were more
precise than the list condition, it was not significant (p = .085 and p = .093, respectively). Still,
the trending pattern of results is clear.
Table 12. Exp. 3 prescription test. Number listed is the percentage of time a working drug was
correctly prescribed based on the number of times that it was used. Standard error is in
parentheses.
Prescription test (Precision)
No support
List

67.4 (3.4)
71.6 (3.2)

List + Code
Matrix
Matrix + Code

70.4 (3.3)
79.5 (3.3)
80.0 (3.5)

This pattern of results suggests that despite prescribing working drugs, like the minor
combination, less often than the two list conditions, the two matrix conditions were highly
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precise at getting those drugs to the right people when prescribed. This provides support for the
idea that the two list conditions knew which drugs worked, but not necessarily on whom, and
hence prescribed the combinations liberally. The two matrix conditions suffered a different fault.
They were able to make clear differentiations between patients, but it appears as if they were
unable to generalize any findings to other patients. In other words, their low prescription rate of
the minor drug (yet high precision) could be interpreted as demonstrating that while knowing this
drug works for some people, they were not likely to apply it to a patient they were unsure of.
Combine this with the fact that they also did not prescribe the major drug any more often than
the other groups, and the full picture emerges. Either they had reasonably precise knowledge of
what worked for that patient, or they prescribed some other (non-working) combination.
Mental Model Test. The perceived effects of the 3 drug combinations of interest are
displayed in Table 13. ANCOVAs were conducted first on the main effects of each drug of
interest, then on their side effect. An ANCOVA on the perceived main effect of the major drug
uncovered significant differences between the groups, F(6, 328) = 2.36, p < .05. Post hoc tests
highlighted the matrix + code condition as reported significantly higher main effect for the major
drug than the no support (p = .002). It was also noted that the list condition reported significantly
higher main effects for the major drug than the no support group (p = .009). Another ANCOVA
was performed on the main effect of the minor drug combination, and it also revealed significant
differences between groups, F(6, 328) = 2.56, p < .05. Post hoc tests showed the list condition as
rating the main effect of the minor drug higher than the no support (p = .043) and matrix + code
conditions (p = .009). Likewise, the list + code condition also rated the main effect higher than
the no support (p = .012) and matrix + code conditions (p = .002). The ANCOVA on the main
effect of the lure combination was not significant, F(3, 328) = 1.04, p > . 35.

35

When evaluating side effects, neither the ANCOVA on the major drug, nor the
ANCOVA on the lure drug was significant. The ANCOVA on the minor drug did however
reveal significant differences, F(6, 328) = 2.15, p < .05. Post hoc tests showed the no support
condition to rate the side effect of the minor drug as significantly more positive than list + code
(p = .002), matrix (p = .011), and matrix + code conditions (p = .019).
Table 13. Exp. 3 mental model test. Number listed is on a scale from -2 to +2. -2 being a strong
negative effect (critical zone) and +2 being a strong positive effect (excellent zone). Standard
error is in parentheses.
Mental model test

Main Effect

Side Effect

Major

Minor

Lure

No support

0.97 (.143)

0.53 (.168)

0.32 (.166)

List

1.47 (.136)

1.02 (.160)

0.18 (.158)

List + Code

1.33 (.139)

1.13 (.164)

0.69 (.161)

Matrix

1.33 (.139)

0.79 (.164)

0.55 (.161)

Matrix + Code

1.63 (.146)

0.39 (.173)

0.48 (.170)

No support

-0.01 (.057)

0.18 (.066)

-0.19 (.074)

List

0.13 (.055)

0.05 (.063)

-0.12 (.071)

List + Code

0.49 (.056)

-0.11 (.064)

-0.02 (.072)

Matrix

-0.06 (.056)

-0.06 (.064)

0.00 (.072)

Matrix + Code

0.01 (.059)

-0.04 (.068)

-0.10 (.076)

These results unfortunately are difficult to interpret. The instructions provided prior to
the test informed participants to report the effect each drug had on the majority of patients. The
intention was for them to list the drug effects according to the majority template. It is possible
however that some people misinterpreted these instructions, and averaged across all 15 patients.
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Perhaps still, some may have disregarded the instructions and listed the drug by its strongest
effect (e.g. reporting the major drug by the majority patients and the minor drug by the minority
patients). The interpretation of the side effect of the minor drug is even more puzzling. While the
ratings were slightly more positive in the no support condition, it is not clear why this distinction
is meaningful.
In summary, the first hypothesis was not clearly supported nor denied. Recall that it was
predicted that the matrix conditions would display better patient level knowledge. In terms of
precision, this is true, while it is not true that they were more accurate. The matrix conditions
showed more precise knowledge for the limited number of patients that they prescribed a
working combination to, while the list conditions displayed a more general (drug focused)
knowledge. The more liberal prescription rates in the list condition yielded higher accuracy than
expected, but it is questionable whether or not this is derived from patient level knowledge. The
second hypothesis regarded the code conditions as demonstrating clearer knowledge of side
effects. While interpretation of the mental model test data is somewhat murky for the major and
minor drug, the data from the lure combination was succinct. The coding did not produce the
expected knowledge benefit. The third prediction was that the matrix + code condition would
have the best overall performance on the task. Though the matrix + code condition did not differ
significantly from the list condition, it still yielded marginally less overall accuracy than the list
condition on the prescription test. Combined with the lack of clear mental model test data, it is
not clear that this prediction was supported. Finally, the last prediction involved the no support
condition demonstrating a good knowledge of the ‘average’ drug effects, while having poor
patient knowledge on the prescription test. This prediction was demonstrated rather well by the
sheer inability of this condition to match the accuracy and precision of the other 4 conditions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study examined several varieties of decision support. Clearly, an external
memory aid was useful in each of the experiments. Providing participants with a list of all 15
possible drug combinations was very helpful across experiments. In addition to reducing
cognitive load, the list appears to facilitate abstraction across patients. This is likely due to a
reduction in opaqueness. Rather than looking for patient differences, focus is shifted to what a
drug does. If a drug has a particular effect, it is likely to have that effect on most/all people. In
the case of the first two experiments, this could remove patient variability as a factor altogether.
The matrix assisted performance differently. Rather than encouraging abstraction, it
allowed for very precise encoding of information. Participants in these conditions were able to
record and process very specific patient level information. Although this also removes
opaqueness relative to patient differences, it does so by increasing the salience of the patient
differences. This extra awareness of differences focuses attention at the individual level, and thus
facilitates a specific (patient) level of encoding.
The inclusion of a coding procedure was designed to increase awareness of the
magnitude of drug effects. This form of support managed to provide some help in each of the
experiments. Participants receiving this support were less likely to prescribe the lure drug
combination. However, this benefit was primarily implicit. That is, participants prescribed the
lure combination less often (thereby recognizing it as defective), but did not reveal any explicit
knowledge of the negative side effect. Instead, they simply reported the combination as having a
lower main effect. This means that they were often prescribing the right treatment to their
patients for the wrong reason. Further research is needed to determine if it is possible to facilitate
an explicit awareness of these drug differences.
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The final form of support used was an elimination strategy. While this manipulation
improved performance over the no support group, participants in this condition did not reach the
performance level of those who received the list only. It is unclear why the strategy interfered
with the task. More research is needed to address this question.
Experiment 3 tried to bring the task closer to what occurs in the real-world. Since patients
do not always respond the same way to the same treatment (as they did in our previous two
experiments), Exp. 3 added different patient types. This naturally contributed an additional level
of variability and complexity to the task. However, it allowed us to explore the relationship
between decision support and processing in complex tasks with more fine-grained differences.
First, we were able to include additional levels of decision support (i.e. matrix conditions). These
conditions received a different type of aid that was aimed at reducing the opaqueness of patient
types. Second, the prescription test allowed for more precise measures of knowledge. We were
able to look at different levels of accuracy and precision with respect to prescription patterns.
The results showed that the decision support groups were all roughly equivalent in their
overall accuracy of drug prescriptions. That is, they tended to prescribe the right drug to the right
person about 50% of the time. This was a clear improvement over the unsupported condition.
Furthermore, when broken down by patient type, it was found that this increase in accuracy came
primarily from the support conditions’ ability to recognize the minority template patients. It is
curious that each of the support conditions seemed to show this increased awareness of the
minority template considering that half of these conditions had no means of recording patient
level information. In other words, providing one with the means to keep track of individuals does
not seem to improve the accuracy rate when prescribing to different patient types.
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Further analysis of the data showed that in addition to having comparable accuracy rates,
the two list conditions seemed to prescribe the minority template drug more often than the two
matrix conditions. This is an important finding because it shows that part of the accuracy of we
find in the list conditions are due to more liberal prescription habits with the minority drug. It
appears as though these conditions are learning information about drug trends and not patient
trends. That is, participants in these conditions are gaining an awareness that the majority drug
works for ‘many people’, and the minority drug works for ‘some people.’ Such knowledge
would lead to increased amounts of prescribing the drug, but would only lead to a moderate level
of accuracy. This latter point was backed up by an analysis of the precision with which each
group made prescriptions. In other words, it was found that the matrix conditions may have
prescribed drugs less often than the list conditions, but were highly accurate during the few times
they did prescribe.
This is an important finding because it shows that despite having comparable accuracy
rates, the two types of decisions support yielded quite different types of knowledge. In terms of
task representation, the list provided the expected general (drug level) knowledge. Participants
were aware of the drug effects, broadly. They knew these drugs worked for some people and
were therefore likely to prescribe it to a patient that they were unsure of. The matrix, however,
encouraged a very specific, but narrow, view of the task. By focusing on the patients, it appears
as though participants in this group were limited in their ability to generalize across patient types.
They were as likely to prescribe a non-working combination to a patient as often as a working
combination, if they did not know what worked for the patient.
These important differences in representation did not appear to affect overall accuracy in
this experiment. However, it is possible that over time differences in accuracy can emerge. While
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the drug level representation more quickly reveals the pattern of responses, it is difficult to see
how this form of representation will ever yield more than the hit-and-miss prescription rates
observed here. Thus, while they may be more accurate at knowing the proportion of people to
which each drug should be prescribed, it is not definite that proportional prescriptions will be
accurate prescriptions. In contrast, it is possible that with more experience, patient level focus
can lead to superior performance. It can be argued that the specific knowledge gained from this
representation takes longer to develop. With more time, it is possible that the highly precise
prescription rates will carry over to more and more patients. That is, one might pick up on either
the general emerging pattern or simply learn about one additional patient at a time. Thus, more
research is needed to address how fast knowledge is gained from the different representations, as
well as, any limits on how much can be known.
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APPENDIX A
ON-SCREEN TEST INSTRUCTIONS
Prescription Test Instructions
On this next screen, you will be asked to indicate the best drug for each patient. You will
make your selection from a list of all possible combinations. You may only select one of these
possible combinations. You will also rate your confidence that this is the best drug for that
patient. When you have made your selection, click ‘submit’, and you will be taken to the next
patient.

Mental Model Test Instructions
On this screen, you will need to summarize your knowledge of all of the drugs. You will
be asked about the effects of each drug (or combination of drugs). Please respond with main
effect that occurs –most commonly- among the patients.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE SIZE CHANGES
Experiment 2
Data collection for this experiment was very slow throughout the semester. In an attempt
to counter this, additional sessions were posted each week. A sudden surge in the participant
pool occurred near the end of the semester. Since 8 participants could enroll per session, the
extra sessions provided a small boost to the overall data pool for this experiment.

Experiment 3
Analysis of the previous experiments using ‘G*Power 3’ estimated power to be quite low
[0.53] (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Therefore, sample size for Experiment 3 was
dramatically increased to achieve an adequate estimated power [.95].
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